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SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
STUDIES
ON THE ECONOMIC SECURITY  
OF RUSSIA’S KALININGRAD EXCLAVE
G. M. Fedorov
Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University 
14 A. Nevski St., Kaliningrad, 236016, Russia
An exclave position makes the economic security problems of the Kaliningrad region more 
complex as compared with other Russian territories. Deteriorating relations between 
Russia and the West compound the situation. This has been especially so since 2014 when 
economic sanctions were imposed against Russia, and the country retaliated. Global 
geopolitical instability adds to the conundrum. This study aims to assess the economic 
security of the Kaliningrad region. Its objectives include defining the concept of regional 
economic security and measuring its level in the Russian Baltic exclave. Possible ways to 
improve the economic security of the region are considered as well. Official statistics on 
the dynamics of industrial production and GRP and 28 other socio-economic indicators 
are used to assess the level of economic security. The region performs well on nine 
indicators and much worse on 19. Proposals for economic restructuring aimed at more 
intensive exploitation of regional natural and labour resources are examined along with 
the region’s prospects as part of the Great Eurasia (Bolshaya Eurasia) project and as an 
‘international development corridor’.
Keywords:  
economic security, Kaliningrad region, exclave position, geopolitical factors, economic 
development
Introduction. The notion of regional economic security
Shortly before the dissolution of the USSR, the Soviet literature borrowed the 
notion of economic security, which had been used abroad since the 1930s. As 
soon as the 1990s, the concept was widely employed in research and manage-
ment.
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At the national level, a major contribution to the development of the research 
theory, methodology, and practice was made by Leonid Abalkin, Andrey Illari-
onov, Sergey Glazyev, Vyacheslav Senchagov, and Vitaly Tambovtsev, whereas 
their colleagues studied economic security at a regional level [1; 2].
There have been many definitions of regional security, but most of them are 
quite close to that formulated in 1995 in the Federal Law on the State Regulation 
of Foreign Trade. The law defines economic security as ‘the state of the economy 
that makes it possible to maintaining a sufficient level of social, political and 
defence development and of the Russian Federation as well as to increase it; the 
invulnerability of the country’s economic interests to possible external and inter-
nal threats and impacts and their independence therefrom’.20
A 1996 presidential executive order approved the first National Strategy for 
the Economic Security of the Russian Federation (Basic Provisions).21
In 2017, two decades of socio-economic and political changes in the country 
and the world prompted the adoption of a new document — the Economic Se-
curity Strategy of the Russian Federation 2030. It defines economic security as 
the ‘protection of the national economy from external and internal threats as well 
as ensuring the country’s economic sovereignty, the uniformity of its economic 
space, and conditions for achieving the strategic national priorities of the Rus-
sian Federation’.22 The challenges and threats to the country’s economic security 
are identified in the document, along with the aim and objectives of the national 
policy. It also lists forty indicators of economic security.
Economic security is studied in many universities. Some of them use the term 
in the names of institutes, faculties, and departments. The Ministry of Education 
of the Russian Federation has approved standards for 38.05.01 Economic Securi-
ty five-year university programme.23
It is important to distinguish between national security of a country, region, 
municipality, industry, and organisation since there is national, regional, munic-
ipal, sectoral, and local economic security. This article deals with regional eco-
nomic security.
20 Federal law No 157-FZ of October 13, 1995. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
acc_e/rus_e/WTACCRUS48_LEG_68.pdf (accessed: 26.09.2020).
21 On the National Strategy for the Economic Security of the Russian Federation (Basic Provi-
sions): Presidential Executive Order of April 29, 1996 No. 608. URL: http://www.consultant.
ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_92725/ (accessed: 22.02.2020).
22 On the Strategy for the Economic Security of the Russian Federation 2030: Presidential 
Executive Order of May 13, 2017, No, 208. URL: https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/
doc/71572608/ (accessed: 22.02 2020).
23 On the approvval of federal state higher education standards for 38.05.01 Economic Secu-
rity five-year programme: order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia of January 
16, 2017, No. 20. URL: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_212678/e2e2b-
88d94c5e2378119590efc50ee180a7db526/ (accessed: 22.02.2020).
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It aims to assess the level of economic security in the Kaliningrad region. To 
this end, regional economic security is defined and the level of economic security 
in Russia’s Baltic is measured. Possible ways to increase the region’s economic 
security are considered.
Usually, to quantify regional economic security, a set of measures is selected 
and compared with threshold values, which are established using logical reason-
ing and data from different regions. This study does the same, but the baseline for 
comparison is national averages. GRP dynamics and changes in manufacturing 
output are also compared with the national average to demonstrate the resistance 
of the region’s economy to external effects.
Why assess the economic security of the Kaliningrad region?
Common sense suggests that an exclave region should be less economically 
secure than the inland regions of the country because of weak transport links to 
the ‘metropole’. In reality, however, the Kaliningrad region enjoys the benefits 
of its coastal position. These include cheap carriage of goods by sea to Europe 
and much more remote, the potential to develop fishery, and proximity to eco-
nomically developed European countries — prospective trade partners.
Immediately after the dissolution of the USSR, Russian researchers did not 
investigate the economic security of Kaliningrad or any other Russian region. 
Russia’s territories were expected to integrate gradually into a common Europe-
an space, which was unthinkable at the time without the country. Russian Baltic 
territories engaged with international organisations in the region. Russia joined 
the Council of the Baltic Sea States, which was established in 1992, and partic-
ipated in its cooperation programmes. In 2002, the NATO-Russia Council was 
created to handle security and political issues.
At first, the region’s special economic regime (the Yantar free economic zone) 
was seen as a shortcut to market relations, business development, and presence 
in the global market rather than a way to overcome the difficulties of exclave 
position. In the second half of the 1990s, in-depth studies into the economic sit-
uation revealed the fragility of the regional economy and its strong dependence 
on external factors [4]. Little by little, the free-zone mechanism came to be per-
ceived as compensation for the additional costs incurred by resident businesses 
because of remoteness from the ‘metropole’. In the 1990s and early 2000s, most 
publications by Russian authors placed high expectations on cooperation be-
tween Russia and the EU: the concepts of ‘pilot region’ and ‘cooperation region’ 
were often mentioned (see 5 for more details). Moreover, the strategy for the 
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social and economic development of the Kaliningrad region adopted in 2003 was 
called the Strategy for Social and Economic Development of the Kaliningrad 
Region as a Cooperation Region 2010.
In the 1990s and the early 2000s, several international projects focusing on 
the Kaliningrad region and its development through Russia-EU cooperation 
were implemented. Foreign authors published books and articles giving a pos-
itive assessment of opportunities for Russian-European economic cooperation 
[6—13]. Other publications paid greater attention to possible difficulties in the 
relations [14—19].
Relations between Russia and Western countries were deteriorating. The ac-
cession of Poland and the Baltics to NATO and the EU led to geopolitical and 
geoeconomic instability, which threatened Russia’s national security and the eco-
nomic security of its exclave region.
Since the mid-2000s, the tenor of most publications by Western authors has 
changed. Although works seeking to promote economic cooperation are still be-
ing published (some of them in collaboration between Russian and international 
authors [20—22]), most Kaliningrad-related materials focus on the national se-
curity of EU and NATO countries in the context of political relations with Russia 
[23—27]. Russian researchers continue to develop ideas that may be instrumental 
in strengthening international cooperation in the Baltic. Yet the eastward expan-
sion of the EU and NATO is switching primary attention to the region’s internal 
resources for development [28—31].
Emerging geopolitical and geoeconomic threats and the increasing NATO 
presence at national borders induced Russia to open a ferry link to the Kalinin-
grad region as well as to build an independent energy system. Particularly, four 
small thermal power plants were constructed to ensure uninterrupted energy sup-
ply in the region (see [3, 29]).
The year 2014, when relations between Russia and the West worsened and 
anti-Russian sanctions were imposed stalling much of cooperation, brought to 
the fore economic security issues. Although financial and institutional govern-
ment support for the region is sufficient to ensure its successful development, 
exclave position makes it less economically secure in comparison to inland 
territories.
The importance of research into the socio-economic position and develop-
ment prospects of the Kaliningrad is underlined by the fact that the Russian 
Foundation for Basic Research has supported projects focusing on the prob-
lem. These are The Coastal Factory in the Competitive Opportunities of the 
Russian Exclave Region: Implementation Mechanisms and Strategies amid 
Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Turbulence (2018—2019) and A Theoretical 
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Framework for the Concept and Strategy for the Development of the Kalin-
ingrad Region as a Priority Geostrategic Territory of the Russian Federation 
(2020—2021).
The studies have identified measures necessary for the sustainable develop-
ment of the region during geopolitical turbulence.
A team of researchers from Kaliningrad, St Petersburg, Rostov-on-Don, 
Smolensk, and Simferopol are conducting a study supported by the grant En-
suring Economic Security of Russian Western Borderland Regions amid Geo-
political Turbulence (2018—2010) from the Russian Science Foundation. The 
monograph Problems of Economic Security of Russian Western Borderland Re-
gions [3] and other publications of the project findings explore major aspects of 
the problem. This article draws on the theoretical and methodological results of 
the mentioned studies.
An assessment of the economic security of the Kaliningrad region
In 2002, Tatyana Shulkina defended her doctoral thesis in economics entitled 
Managing the processes of ensuring the economic security of the Kaliningrad 
region. Most of the problems she identified remain relevant to date. The region’s 
economic potential has increased significantly and many (primarily geopolitical) 
factors for the development of the regional economy have changed since then. 
Souring Russia-EU relations and the West’s sanctions against Russia lent new 
urgency to assessing the situation in the Russian Baltic exclave.
In our opinion, the main feature of the region’s economic security is unsteady 
economic development. Thus, the dynamics of GRP and key regional industries 
should be compared with the national average. The level of economic security is 
below the national average when the range of fluctuations in economic develop-
ment is above the average across the country, especially if growth rates in the pe-
riods of rapid development are above the national average and recessions during 
crises are deeper than that. Even in times of dramatic growth, unsteady year-on-
year rates mean that the regional economy is not sufficiently resistant to external 
effects. This points to the presence of threats to economic security.
Development rates in the Kaliningrad region are indeed more erratic than those 
observed across the country. This is especially noticeable when assessing the de-
velopment dynamics of the region’s leading industry — manufacturing (Fig. 1). 
The volatility of GRP dynamics is less pronounced (Fig. 2). This is the effect of 
a more stable situation in social services. The above data analysis suggests that, 
as expected, the level of economic security of the Kaliningrad region is below the 
national average. Examining individual indicators will aid in evaluating the most 
serious threats to regional economic security.
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Fig.1. Difference between the regional and national rates of growth in the output  
of manufacturing companies, percentage points
Source. Prepared based on Manufacturing. EMISS (United Interdepartmental Sys-
tem of Information and Statistics). URL: https://gks.ru/enterprise_industrial?print=1# 
(accessed 20.02.2020); Production index (OKVED2). EMISS United Interdepart-
mental System of Information and Statistics). URL: https://gks.ru/enterprise_industri-
al?print=1# (accessed 20.02.2020).
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Fig. 2. Difference between the rate of GRP volume growth in the Kaliningrad region 
and the national average, percentage points, 1998—2018
Source. Prepared based on GRP volume indices in 1998—2018. URL: https://mrd.
gks.ru/folder/27963 (accessed 20.02.2020).
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The collective monograph mentioned above carries out a comparison of the 
economic security of Russia’s western borderland regions using several socio-
economic indicators [3].
Ksenia Voloshenko compiled a list of 20 general, 15 special, and 37 specific 
indicators for assessing the economic security of a border region [3, pp. 93—
107]. The list draws on previous analysis and the author’s own findings. I will 
use this list below. Table 1 demonstrates the 20 general indicators, which apply 
to any Russian region, as well as GRP dynamics (line 2), which seem at least as 
important as the other 20 measures.
Table 1
General indicators of the economic security of the Kaliningrad region 
Indictor Threshold value
Actual value KR as 
com-
pared to 
RFRF KR*
1. Annual GRP per capita to the national 
average, %, 2018
At least 
100 100 80 -
2. Physical volume Index of GRP in % to 
the average for the regions of the Russian 
Federation
At least 
100 102.8 103.3
+
3. Consumer price index, December 2018 to 
the December 2017 baseline, %
No more 
than 106 104.3 104.8 -
4. Capital investment to GRP, % At least 25 20.7 28.3 +
5. Consumption of fixed capital (as of the end 
of 2018 for all companies, %)
No more 
than 60 50.9 31.6
+
6. Cereal yield (processed weight) per capita, 
kg, 2014–2018 average 
At least 
7.5 790 440 - 
7. Percentage of innovative good and services 
in the total volume of goods shipped and 
services provided, 
%, 2018 
At least the 
national 
average
6.5% 0.3% - 
8. Technological innovation spending to R&D 
expenditure, %, 2018 
At least 
200 143 57 - 
9. Volume of shipped innovative goods to 
technological innovation spending, %, 2018 
At least 
200 307 253 -
10. Consolidate budget deficit, % of GRP, 
2018 
No more 
than 3
Surplus 
2.7
Sur-
plus 
0.5
-
11. Percentage of loss-making companies, %, 
2018 
Not above 
the nation-
al average
33.1 41.6 -
12. Annual average population change, 2019, 
% of the 2018 baseline
At least 
100 99.96 100.8
+ 
13. R/P 10% (the ratio of the average income 
of the richest 10% to the poorest 10%), 2018 
No more 
than 8 15.6 10.5
+
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Indictor Threshold value
Actual value
KR as 
com-
pared to 
RFRF KR*
15. Monetary income per capita to the mini-
mum cost of living (as of the fourth quarter), 
-fold
At least 
3.5
3.2 2.5 -
16. The average amount of pension to the 
average gross payroll of organisation employ-
ees, %, 2018 
At least 40 29.8 40.1 +
17. Unemployment rate following the ILO 
definition, %, 2018 
No more 
than 4
4.8 4.7 +
18. Life expectancy at birth, years At least 80 73.3 73.6 +
19. Total fertility rate, 2018 At least 
2.2
1.58 1.51 -
20. Housing per resident, m2, as of the end of 
2018
At least 25 25.8 28.2 +
21. Crimes per 100,000 population, 2019 No more 
than 5000
1379 1480 - 
Comment: *KR is the Kaliningrad region; + is a positive estimate; — is a negative 
estimate. Positive values are given in semi-bold. Voloshenko gives the list of indicators 
(except line 2) and associated threshold values in section 5.3 of the monograph Problems 
of Economic Security of Russian Western Borderland Regions (Kaliningrad: Immanuel 
Kant Baltic Federal University Press, 2019).
Source. Prepared by the authors based on data from Gross regional product per 
capita. EMISS (United Interdepartmental System of Information and Statistics. URL: 
https://fedstat.ru/indicator/42928 (accessed 03.07.2020); Kaliningrad region in digits. 
2019. Vol. 1. Kaliningrad: Kaliningradstat, 2019; Legal statistics portal. URL: crimes-
tat.ru/regions_chart_total (accessed 03.07.2020); Dynamics of the average amount of 
pensions awarded. URL: https://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/urov/doc3—
1—1.htm (accessed: 03.07.2020); Russian regions. Socio-economic indicators. 2019: 
statistics. Moscow : Rosstat, 2019.
I also employ the threshold values quoted by Voloshenko for assessing the lev-
el of economic security. Since threshold values are conditional on many factors, 
including the researcher’s opinion, I propose to use a comparison with the na-
tional average. This will make it possible to assess selected aspects of economic 
security in juxtaposition with other Russian regions.
The end of Table 1
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Table 1 contains two groups of indicators. The first one shows the state 
of the economy (1—11); the second (12—21), regional social and demo-
graphic features, which are determined by the level, structure and rate of 
economic development. Although the list may vary slightly depending on 
the researcher’s opinion, it seems that it has everything to assess the eco-
nomic security of a region.
The performance of the Kaliningrad region on 10 out of 21 indicators 
is within the threshold values. On nine indicators, the region does better 
than the national average. In seven cases, both results are positive, in eight, 
both are negative. Thus, different results are obtained for six indicators. 
Although the region’s GRP per capita is 20% below the national average, 
its growth rate is higher, plants and equipment are less depreciated, and 
the investment/GRP ratio is higher as well. The key problems are the ex-
tremely low innovations rate of the regional economy and the high share 
of loss-making enterprises. The crime rate is above the national average. 
Incomes are below the average across the country, whereas the housing per 
capita value is above that. The regional unemployment rate is low.
Apart from the general indicators, an assessment of the economic securi-
ty of the Kaliningrad region should take into account its border and exclave 
situation. It is described by specific and special indicators (see Table 2). The 
former add to general indicators, and the latter give additional information.
Most measures shown in Table 2, except the potato and meat output, 
indicate that the region’s level of economic security is insufficient. Low 
international investment is a result of poor relations with neighbouring 
countries. Regional needs for the agricultural products that can be easily 
produced locally are not met. Fiscal transfers are substantial because of 
the modest revenues of the regional budget. All transport links to mainland 
Russia, except maritime ones, involve travel across at least one foreign 
state. Bilateral trade with Poland and Lithuania, which has been declining 
since 2010, is insignificant. The region’s manufacturing companies de-
pend heavily on the imports of raw materials, components, and equipment. 
None of the three is delivered from other Russian regions in sufficient 
volumes. Exports are low — half of the regional produce is shipped to the 
‘metropole’.
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Table 2
Specific (1 – 3) and special (4 – 7) indicators of the economic security  
of the Kaliningrad region
Measure Value
1. Ratio of international investment in the economy 
of the Kaliningrad region per capita to the national 
average, %, 2017 
31
2. Percentage of fiscal transfer in the consolidated 
regional budget, %, 2019 
57.7
3. Production of key foodstuffs to the regional needs, 
%, 2017
Potatoes, meat 100; 
vegetables 58; milk 76; 
eggs 85; cereals*
4. Transport links to other Russian regions not involv-
ing travel across other countries
only maritime
5. Exports and imports to/from the neighbouring 
countries to the total regional exports and imports, %, 
2017   
Exports 7.9;  imports 
1.7
6. Ration of exports and imports per capita to the 
national average, %, 2017 
Exports 53;
imports 473
7. Goods purchased/sold from/to other Russian re-
gions, % of shipped regionally-produced goods and 
of services provided by the regional manufacturing 
industry, %, 2015
Sold 49.3; purchased 
9.5
Comment: *the output was 56% of the national average in 2014–2018. Durum 
wheat, which is used in making bread, is not grown in the region. 
Source. EMISS. URL:  https://www.fedstat.ru/ (accessed 02.03.2020); Statistics. 
URL: https://kaliningrad.gks.ru/statistic (accessed 02.03.2020); Budgeting process. 
Ministry of Finance of the Kaliningrad region. URL: https://minfin39.ru/budget/ana-
lytics/  In 2018 the region will produce enough vegetables and fruit to meet 60% of its 
needs. URL: https://kgd.ru/news/society/item/65871-k-2018-godu-region-budet-obe-
spechivat-sebya-ovoshhami-i-fruktami-menshe-chem-na-60 (accessed 03.03.2020).
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Conclusion
Greatly affected by the crisis of the 1990s and rapidly developing in the 
conditions of the Yantar free zone and the succeeding special economic zones, 
the economy of the Kaliningrad region grew deeply dependent on the insti-
tutional environment, foreign politics, and the situation in the world market. 
Although the level of regional economic security decreased as a result, the 
regional economy developed more rapidly in the region than in most Russian 
territories. Moreover, it achieved a relatively high level when external condi-
tions were stable.
Nevertheless, during crises, regional output was falling more dramatically 
than in inland Russian territories. The coronavirus-caused decrease in manufac-
turing was sharper in Kaliningrad than in most of its counterparts. The heavi-
est blow was dealt to companies engaged in partial import substitution — they 
use imported raw materials and components.24 Imports dropped significantly, by 
23.5%, in the first five months of 2020 as compared to the same period of 2019.25 
The output of the region’s largest holding company, the car manufacturer Av-
totor, declined by 37%.26
Given the dependence of the regional economy on external conditions, it is 
difficult to devise an effective and easily implemented strategy for the social 
and economic development of the territory, especially one that does not require 
substantial investment or fundamental economic restructuring.
An unfinished but still not abandoned attempt to give the region a new struc-
ture of production was the beginning of the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant construc-
tion in 2010. A cluster of energy-intensive companies may once form around it. 
The construction was suspended in 2014.
The region’s low level of economic security manifested itself in the re-
gional economy’s response to deteriorating Russia-EU relations. Even be-
fore the anti-Russian sanctions, Kaliningrad’s bilateral trade with its former 
partners — Germany, Poland, and Lithuania — began to decline. After spring 
2014, the reduction was particularly remarkable. Still, there is a global eco-
nomic project, Greater Eurasia, that seeks to restore these trade connections 
to advance economic cooperation between China, Russia, Europe, and Central 
24 Only 14 Russian regions fell more sharply in January–May 2019 than Kaliningrad (Produc-
tion index. EMISS). URL: https://fedstat.ru/indicator/57806 (accessed 15.07.2020).
25 International trade o the Kaliningrad region. Kaliningrad regional customs. URL: http://
koblt.customs.gov.ru/statistic/2020-god (accessed 06.07.2020).
26 Reduction in Avotor’s production output revealed. Kaliningrad. July 3, 2020. URL: 
https://kaliningrad.rbc.ru/kaliningrad/03/07/2020/5eff244d9a79472d5fb594a3 (accessed 
15.07.2020).
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and Western Asian countries. In this case, the Kaliningrad region may finally 
benefit from its geographical position and become an important link in the 
East-West relationship (possibly in cooperation with neighbouring Polish and 
Lithuanian regions). Kaliningrad will have the opportunity to become an inter-
national development corridor, which the St Petersburg–Leningrad region spa-
tial system has largely done. The region is already performing some functions 
of an international development corridor.
It is possible to increase the economic security of the region by unlocking 
its internal resources and creating regional and interregional clusters. There are 
noteworthy projects focusing on clean agriculture, medical tourism and recre-
ation, clustering in the amber and construction industries (the latter, probably, 
in collaboration with St Petersburg), establishing an air hub and developing 
concomitant industries, creating an IT cluster, and promoting the Technopolis 
GS innovation cluster. The Baltic Valley innovation and technology park is to 
be created. It is to specialise in health protection, rehabilitation technology, 
food and industrial biotechnology, personalised nutrition, engineering, and in-
dustrial design.27 If implemented, these projects will reduce external threats and 
contribute to the economic security of the region.
Expanding the Kaliningrad port complex was discussed at some point. Par-
ticularly, there was a proposal to turn it into an outer port of St Petersburg. This 
would pose the problem of increased transit through foreign countries. In my 
opinion, there is also a need to create several more large enterprises, such as 
Avtotor and Sodruzehstvo-Soya, that will import raw materials and components 
from Latin America, Asia or Africa and ship its produce to Russia (as Avtotor) or 
export it (as Sodruzehstvo-Soya). Each of the projects is associated with certain 
threats to economic security, for example, that of possible cessation of deliveries 
from partner states.
NATO’s eastward expansion is bringing to the fore the security and defence 
function of the Kaliningrad region as a geostrategic national territory. The de-
fence component of the regional economy is growing. This makes the economy 
more stable and increases the region’s economic security.
In the 1990s-early 2000s, experts and researchers discussed a possible Rus-
sia-EU agreement on supporting the livelihood of the Kaliningrad region. Un-
fortunately, this idea never came to fruition. I believe that it should be revived. 
Concluding such an agreement or its mere presence of the agenda may contrib-
ute at least to the transport security of the region.
The economic security of the Kaliningrad region requires solving many prob-
lems, and that is being done gradually. This article outlines some of the ways to 
27 Alikhanov tells what Baltic Valley technology park is to do. URL: https://kaliningrad.rbc.
ru/kaliningrad/05/03/2020/5e60b3679a794722aa004b80 (accessed 07.03.2020).
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deal with these problems, which demand further investigation. Despite current 
issues, the regional economy is developing. There are reasons to hope that feder-
al support and internal resources will help it overcome the adverse effects of the 
West’s sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic.
This article was supported by grant No. 20-05-00399 A Theoretical Frame-
work for the Concept and Strategy for the Development of the Kaliningrad Re-
gion as a Priority Geostrategic Territory of the Russian Federation from the 
Russian Foundation for Basic Research.
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